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matter concerning which the declarant was immediately and personall/ cognisant: 11 M. & W. 773. As the reason of the doc.
trine is the improbability of falsehood arising from the fact that
men do not usually make admissions against interest, unless the
truth compels them to do so, it is not indispensable that the
declaration should be accompanied by an act, but if not so accompanied, this will very greatly depreciate its value. See section 4,
supra.
4th. In addition to the other requisites, the court should b6
satisfied upon the circumstances of the particular case, that there
was no probable motive to falsify the fact declared, as where the
declaration is made ante litam motem, or at a period so remote
from the controverted transaction as to preclude all suspicion that
it was manufactured for the occasion: Gilchrist vs. Martin, 1
Bailey's Eq. 492, and cases cited in section 5, supra.
If these four conditions are fully met, the testimony is to be
received for what it is worth ; and its weight and value will depend upon all the attendant circumstances which characterize the
J. F. D.
declaration or admission.
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A policy of insurance containing a clause that goods held on commission must be
insured as such, is to be interpreted by its own terms, and parol evidence is not
admissible to show that the insurers knew the kind of business of the insured,
and the character of his interest in the goods.
There was an insurance by appellant upon goods of class A. (the appellees' own
goods merely), and insurance by another company on goods of classes A. and
B. indiscriminately (class B. being goods held on commission). The appellantspolicy contained a covenant that no greater proportion of a loss should be recovered under it than the amount thereby insured should bear to the whole
amount of all the insurances on the premises. The loss on goods of class B.
slone, was greater than the second company's entire insurance, and it accord.
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ingly paid the full amount without reference to the classes of goods: Held, that
the second insurance was not within the effect of the covenant for proportion,
and that the appellant was not entitled to any abatement of its liability by
reason thereof.
The policy contained a clause that the loss should be paid within sixty days after
it should be ascertained and proved. The loss was duly proved within the
sixty days, and was acknowledged by the company who offered payment of
'what it assumed as the amount of its liability (but in fact a smaller sum than it
was bound for), and then refused to pay any larger sum: Held, that thereby
the condition as to the sixty days was waived, and interest was due from that
date on the sum for which the company was really bound.

The Baltimore Insurance Company insured Loney & Co. against
loss by fire to the amount of $5000 on goods contained in a certain warehouse, &c., " as per application."
The application was in the following form: "B. S. & W. A.
Loney & Co. wish to obtain insurance to the amount of $5000
on goods contained in the three-story warehouse," &c. The warehouse was burned, and goods destroyed to the amount of $88,000,
of which $16,855.02 belonged to Loney & Co., as their own
property, and the rest as held for sale on commission, and on the
latter they had a lien for advances, &c., amounting to $36,909.89,
making their interest in the said goods, apart from that of their
consignors, $52,764.41.
The policy issued by the Baltimore company, contained clauses
providing that any other insurance on the same property should
be indorsed on it, which was done; and also providing that in case
of such other insurance " the insured shall not, in case of loss or
damage, be entitled to demand or recover on this policy any
greater proportion of the loss sustained than the amount hereby
insured shall bear to the whole amount of the several insurances
made, or to be made, on the premiseg insured by this policy."
One of the conditions annexed to the policy was "goods held in
trust or on commission, are to be declared as such, otherwise the
policy will not extend to cover such property."
In addition to this policy, Loney & Co. had others amounting
altogether to 85,000, the whole being insufficient by $3000 to
cover the value of the goods lost. All of the other policies were
in language slightly varied, but amounting to the same thing,
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"on merchandise their own, or held by them in trust or on commission, and sold and not delivered," and each required goods on
commission to be specified as such.
These facts were not disputed, and the sole question was as to
the amount of liability of the insurance company. On the trial
the plaintiffs (appellees) proved that when the policy was issued,
they were engaged in business as commission merchants; that
they were accustomed to insure goods held on commission, and
that this must have been known to the company. They also gave
evidence of the usual mode of settling payments for losses in such
cases. The jury found a verdict for plaintiffs for $5006.54, but
both parties having excepted to the charge of the court on points
presented, appealed to the present court.
William iSchley, for appellants.-1. The allowance of interest
was erroneous. The loss was payable in sixty days, and even if
the denial of liability to the extent claimed was improper, still the
time of payment, as fixed by the contract, was not thereby accelerated. If the principal was not due on May 7th, interest could
not accrue frbm that day: Allegre vs. Insurance Companyy6 H.
& J. 413; Newson'8 Adm'r. vs. .Douglas, 7 Id. 417.
2. The other insurances covered the plaintiffs' own goods as
well as those on commission. Covering both classes, they covered
each, and if property of either class was destroyed, the assured
was entitled to indemnity even if no part of the other class was
injured. The risk was not limited to a blended loss. Therefore
being other insurances on the same property, they were within
the covenant, and defendants are liable only for their proportion
of the loss: Angell on Ins.,' §§ 26, 88 ; Whiting vs. Insurance
Company, 15 Md. 297, and cases there cited; Storer vs. Insurance Company, 45 Maine 179 ; Haley vs. Insurance Company, 1
Allen 536; 1 Phillips on Ins. 836; 2 Id. 1263, n. 2.
3. The policy is to be construed by its terms, and they plainly
limit the defendants' liability to the value of plaintiffs' own goods:
Carpenter vs. Providence Company, 16 Peters 506; -Parksvs.
Tnsurance Company, 5 Pick. 33; Insurance Company vs. Law.
rence, 2 Peters 48; 2 Marshall on Ins. 789; Angell on Ins., § 74.
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aud note 4, p. 115; Ralhead vs. Young, 36 E. L. & E. 109;
.Bughesvs. JFendall, Id. 415.
Reverdy Johnson and Wallis & Thomas, for appellees.-l.
Insurance is eminently a contract of good faith. No particular form of notice was required that the goods were held on
commission, and if the insurance company actually knew the fact
it is immaterial how they learned it: Insurance Company vs.
Crane, 16 Md. 260; Insurance Company vs. Stewart, 7 Harris
45; Tnsurance Company vs. Bruner, 11 Id. 50; Wilson vs.
Insurance Company, 16 Barbour 511; Marshall vs. Insurance
Company, 7 N. H. 157; Insurance Company vs. Hewitt, 3 B.
Monroe 231; Etna Insurance Company vs. Jackson, 16 3.
Monr. 242.
2. The goods on which plaintiffs had a lien were their own goods
within the meaning of the policy to the extent of their lien, and
insurable in the name of the plaintiffs: Insurance Company vs.
Coates, 14 Md. 285; Russell vs. Insurance Company, I W. C. 0.
R. 409; De Forest vs. Insurance Company, 1 Hall 84; Lee vs.
Barreda, 16 Md. 198; Insurance Company vs. Deal, 18 Md. 47.
3. The policies, by their' language, insured the plaintiffs from all
loss on the goods in question. They are not so insured unless
they are fully indemnified for all they would have made out of
them-at least to the full extent of those belonging to them absolutely, and of their advances and commissions on those consigned.
But for the condition in reference to goods held on commission,
the policies would have covered the interest of the consignors as
well as consignees. That condition was only intended to guard
against liability for the interest of strangers, of whose integrity
the underwriters knew nothing: Water's vs. Insurance Company,
85 . 0. L. R. 870; De Forest vs. Insurance Company, I Hall
84, 1 Arnould on Ins. 246-7 ; Stilwell vs. Staples, 6 Duer 63, s. c.
5 Smith 401.
4. The plaintiffs were entitled to apply the amount received by
them from other companies whose policies covered two classes of
goods, to that class not covered by the defendant's policies, and
the court ought so to marshal them as to make all the policies to-
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gether cover, as far as practicable, the entire loss. Contribution
from "blended," or ",non-concurrent policies," as they are called,
is not allowed, when the effect of it would be to leave any part of
the loss unpaid. The insured ought to suffer no loss so long as
there is a specific policy unexhausted. Insurance Monitor 111.
112: Kane vs. Insurance Company, 8 Johns. 229, 236; Bousfield vs. Barnes, 4 Camp. 227 ; Minturn vs. Insurance Company,
10 Johns. 75; MeKim vs. Insurance Company, 2 W. C. C. R.
89; Raley vs. Insurance Company, 1 Allen 586, 1 Phillips on
Ins., sects. 124, 367-8.
5. The clause in reference to apportionment of losses among
different companies, like the "American Clause" in marine
policies, is only applicable to cases of partial loss, or of over insurance-not to a case where all the policies together amount to
less than the loss sustained: 2 Phillips on Ins., sect. 1263, 1 Id.
367-8 ; 2 Am. Leading C. 651.
6. The other policies, insuring a gross amount on the plaintiffs'
own goods, and on those held on commission, without specifying the
amount intended to be insured on each, were not such as entitled
the defendants to an apportionment of the loss with respect to
them, and the defendants were therefore bound to the.same extent
as if such other policies had not been in existence: Howard
Insurance Company vs. Scribner, 5 Hill 298.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
COCHRAN, J.-This suit was brought on a policy of insurance,
issued by the appellants on the 27th of August 1855, and continued
by successive renewals to the 1st of July, 1857, by which the
appellees, as copartners, were insured to the amount of $5000
against loss by'fire on goods contained in the third story of a
brick warehouse on Hanover street in the city of Baltimore. The
policy contains a condition that it should not cover goods held in
trust or on commission, unless they were so declared, and also
clauses providing that other insurances on the same property shoul
be indorsed upon it, and in case of such'other insurance and ot
subsequent loss, that the appellees should not be entitled to
demand or recover any greater portion of the loss or damage sus.
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tained, than the amount thereby insured should bear to the whole
amount of the several insurances effected.
-,
the 25th of
December 1855, the appellees obtained another insurance on the

same goods to the amount of $10,000, afterwards increased to
$15,000 by a policy containing the same clauses and conditions
issued by the Firemen's Insurance Company of Baltimore. The
property insured was subsequently removed, by permission of
that company and the appellant, to No. 35 S. Charles street.
Prior to the 14th of April 1857, the appellees had effected, and
then held, in addition to these insurances, six other policies for an
aggregate amount of $65,000, issued by foreign companies, containing clauses requiting goods held on commission to be so
specified, and in which the goods insured were substantially described as their own, or held by them for sale on commission. On
the date last mentioned, the stock of goods amounting in value to
$88,113.88, on which these several insurances were obtained, was
'destroyed by fire. A portion of the goods amounting to
$16,855.02 belonged to the appellees, and the remainder, valued
at $71,258.36, on which they had a lien for commissions and
advances to the amount of $36,909.39, were held by them for sale
on commission.
The loss was $3113.88 in excess of the whole amount of insurance, and the portion covered by the foreign policies was paid
without reference to appraisement or contribution, leaving the
balance of the loss, $23,113.38, to be satisfied by the policies of
the two Baltimore companies to the extent of their respective liabilities. The conditions of the policy as to preliminary proof,
were complied with, and demand made for payment of the whole
amount insured by it on the 7th day.of May 1857, but the appellant, contending that its liability was limited to loss on the
appellees' own goods, and proportioned thereon to the aggregate
amount of all the policies, offered in satisfaction thereof to pay the
sum of $991.13, which the appellees refused to accept. Evidence
was offered at -the trial without exception, showing that the
appellees were commission merchants chiefly engaged in selling
goods consigned to them for sale on commission; that they were
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generally known to be so engaged, and the custom of such merchants of keeping large quantities of commission goods in store,
and also tending to show that the appellant received the application for this insurance and issued this policy with a knowledge of
these facts.
Several prayers, involving the construction of the policy, were
offered on both sides, all of which depend on the determination of
two questions :-st.
As to the extent of the risk covered by the
policy; and 2d. As to the amount of the appellant's liability
upon it.
The appellees contended, on the hypothesis that the appellant
knew their application was intended to be for insurance on all the
goods destroyed, both their own and those held on commission,
that the policy should be so construed as to give effect to that
intention, or in other words, that the extent of the risk underwritten should be ascertained from the fact stated, and not from
the terms of the policy.
The. rule presented in this proposition we think cannot be applied
here. The authorities referred to in support of the construction
sought present facts so far different from those in this case, as to
involve other principles. In all of them the construction turned
either upon the meaning of terms, which by usage or custom had
acquired a particular sense, or on evidence that insurer, after a
full disclosure of facts material to the risk, and in violation of
an obligation implied therefrom, neglected to insert in the -policy
such a reference to those facts as was essential to its validity as a
contract of insurance. Parol evidence was admitted in one class,
not to change or vary the contract, but to explain the meaning of
the terms used, and in the other to prevent the insurer from obtaining the advantage of a contract, which through his fault, would
otherwise have been without obligation and void.
The policy in this case is entirely consistent with the terms of
the application, free from ambiguity, and susceptible of a consistent construction in all its parts, and if there was mistake or error
in the insurance effected, it does not appear to be one attributable
to the appellant, nor such as to authorize us to look beyond the
VOL. XII.-42
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terms of the policy in ascertaining its meaning and legal effect.
We think it cannot be excepted from the operation of the general
rule requiring written contracts to be interpreted by their own
terms, without regard to extrinsic facts: Mumford vs. Hallet, 1
Johns. 489; Mellen & Nesmith vs. NT7"ational Insurance Company,
1 Hall 452, Phil. Ins. 47, 319.
The appellees appear to have obtained this insurance without
making any specific statement of the nature of their interest in the
goods destroyed, and had there been no express condition to the
contrary, their interest in the goods held on commission might
have been covered by the policy, for upon that state of fact, the
material question would have been, whether the failure to inform
the insured that the goods were held on commission would have
affected the risk, and the admission that the communication of that
fact would not have changed the rate of premium, might have been
relied on as concluding it. But that is not the question here.
'This policy expressly provides that it was not to cover goods held
on commission unless they were so declared, or as we understand
it, so expressed as to appear, in some form, in the description of
the goods intended to be covered by it. The right of the insurer
to limit the extent of the risk by that condition cannot be doubted:
Phillips vs. Knox County Insurance Company, 20 Ohio 174 ;
Briehta vs. Lafayette Insurance Company, 2 Hall 372 ; 2 Am.
Lead. Cases 642. And as we must presume, from the acceptance
of the policy by the appellees, that they had knowledge of that
condition, we think it should have the contemplated effect of
limiting the risk to the goods which belonged to them.
The next inquiry is as to the amount of liability on the policy,
for the loss sustained on those goods.. As we have before stated,
the appellees held seven other policies, six of which, issued by
foreign companies, covered the goods owned by -them as well as
those held on commission, on blended risks to the amount of
$65,000, the remaining one for $15,000, issued by the Firemen's
Insurance Company of Baltimore, covering their own goods only.
There is no question in regard to the latter policy, but as the
others covered the goods of the appellees, although blended in the
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risk with those held on commission, the appellant insists that they
are insurances within the meaning and effect of the covenant
relating to other insurances, and therefore that it is not liable for
any greater portion of the loss on those goods, than the amount
insured on this policy bears to the aggregate amount of all the
policies.

In considering this proposition, it is proper to observe that the
contract of insurance is one of indemnity, intended to protect the
insured from loss, to the amount of the risk assured, whether it be
one or several policies, and that in general, the provisions of the
contract are favorably construed for the insured in furtherance of
that principle.
The covenant in this policy limiting the liability upon it to a
share of the- loss in proportion to the amount of all the policies
was not intended to impair the right of the appellees to the full
indemnity which would otherwise be afforded by them, but to
ascertain the amount of the appellant's liability, subject to that
right, by an apportionment of the loss among such of the insurers
of the same goods, as by the terms of their contracts should stand
in the relation of co-sureties for any loss upon them. To establish that relation the policies should cover distinct and specific
risks on the same subject, and in that sense constitute a-double
insurance upon which, without the covenant in question, the liabilities of the several insurers, except as to difference in the
amounts underwritten, would be identical, and their rights to contribution reciprocal. The right to contribution is based upon the
c6ncurrence of the policies, and the necessary incident of its
existence is that the several insurers should be bound with equal
certainty, and in the same sense, for the same loss: Lucas vs.
Jefferson Insurance Company, 6 Cow. 635; Angell Ins. 134, 135.
As we understand the authorities, this covenant relates only to
policies which constitute a double insurance, or, in other words,
it contemplates only such insurances as fix upon the insurers
liabilities for this loss, which the insured- could not resort to for
the satisfaction of other losses; and the question here is,. whether
the foreign policies were insurances of that character.
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The loss of the appellees, on the goods held on commission,
exceeded the whole amount of their insurance on those policies;
and if the covenant relating to other insurances be permitted to
have the effect claimed, it is obvious that the right of the appellees to indemnity upon them, would be defeated to the extent of
the apportionment to them of the loss sustained on their own
goods. These policies, as we have seen, covered both classes of
the goods, without any specific apportionment of the amounts
insured to either, and the application of them under the covenant
to one class only, in derogation of the right of the insured to
indemnity for loss on the other, could be effected only by an
arbitrary restriction of the scope and terms of the policies. The
covenant proceeds on the theory that the insurers are to be discharged from some portion of their respective liabilities, by an
apportionment of the loss to the several policies. In that respect
it proposes a mutual and common advantage to all the insurers
affected by it, entirely consistent with the protection of the insured, and there is no apparent reason why it should be permitted
to have effect upon other insurances, when, from the nature of the
case, the common advantage contemplated by it becomes impossible. An apportionment to the foreign policies of the loss on the
goods covered by this policy, without any reciprocal operation in
the way of releasing the foreign insurers from any portion of the
amount. of their several liabilities, would effect a disproportionment of the risks to the rates of insurance on the respective
policies by a practical reduction of the appellant's liability. In
that aspect of the case, the appellant alone would derive the
benefit of a condition intended to operate for the common advantage of such other insurers as might be-affected by it. It cannot
be pretended in that view, that the appellant and foreign insurers
were bound with equal certainty and in the same sense for the
loss on the appellees' goods, or that there was any mutuality in
their relations and rights as insurers of the same subject. We do
not wish to be understood as saying that the insurers on the home
and foreign policies could, under no circumstances, have been
equally bound and liable as co-sureties for that loss, for had the
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loss on the commission goods been less than the amount of insurance on the foreign policies, it might well be said that the excess
of that insurance would have been applicable to the loss insured
against by the home policies, and the liabilities and rights of the
foreign insurers, to the extent of that excess, identical with those
of the home insurers. But in this case the loss on the commission
goods was sufficient to exhaust all the policies covering them; and
as the insurers on the home and foreign policies, in view of the
right of the insured to full indemnity, became subject to different
liabilities by the loss as it occurred, we think the foreign policies
were not within the effect of the covenant relating to other insurances, and that the appellant is not dntitled to any abatement of
its liability on this policy by reason of them: Raley vs. Dorchester Mutual Insurance Company, 1 Allen 536 ; howard Insurance
Company vs. Scribner, 5 Hill 298.
The objection made to the allowance of interest from the 7th
of May, 1857, when payment was demanded, is founded on a
clause contained in the 9th condition of the policy providing for
the payment. of loss within sixty days after the same should be
ascertained and proved. There was no dispute as to the right of
the appellees to interest after the time fixed for payment by that
condition, it being an established rule that interest may be
claimed from the time the principal sum becomes payable by the
terms of the policy: McLaughlin vs. Washington County Mutual
Insurance Company, 23 Wend. 525; Hallet vs. Phcenix Insurance
Company, 2 Wash. 0. C. R. 279. The principle involved is the
same as in cases where, by the expiration of the time limited for
the payment of a principal sum, interest becomes payable for the
time the sum due may be withheld; and the objection made to the
allowance of interest in this case, presents the question whether
the amount to be paid on this policy was due and recoverable on
the day from which the interest allowed was computed. We have
no doubt on that point. It appears from the statement of facts
made by agreement of the parties that the conditions of the policy
as to preliminary proof, were complied with, and a demand of
payment made on the date mentioned, and that the appellant
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thereupon admitted the loss, and offered payment of what it
assumed to be the amount of its liability, but in fact a less sum
than it was bound for, and then denying all further obligation on
the policy, refused to pay any other larger sum.
Upon these facts we must hold that the condition as to the time
of payment was waived, and thaf the sum for which the appellant
was bound .then became due and recoverable. In our opinion, the
allowance of interest is not open to objection.
From our examination of the whole case, we conclude that the
first and second prayers of the appellant, and the sixth of the
appellees, -were properly granted, and that there was no error in
the rejection of the others.
Judgment affirmed.
I. Questions concerning the right of
a person to insure in his own name,
goods not belonging to him, have been
productive of frequent litigation, and
of many attempts to fix with accuracy
the nature and amount of an "insurable
interest." It appears, however, to be
now well settled, that a consignee, factor, or agent, may insure in his own
name, to the amount of his lien for
advances, &a., whether these advances
were upon the special goods insured, or
on a general balance: 1 Phillips on Insurance, ch. 3, 7; Parks vs. General Insurance Co., 5 Pick. 83. And it seems
to be the better opinion that, if he has a
general authority over the goods, as a
commission merchant over goods in his
bands for sale, he may insure to the full
value in his own name, and will recover
the excess over his lien, for the benefit
of the owners.
For this latter position the leading
authority, and indeed the most exhaustive summary of the whole subject, is the
case of De Forest vs. The Fulton Fire
Insurance Co., 1 Hall 84, decided by
the Superior Court of the city of New
Vork, in 1828, after elaborate argument
and mature consideration. In that case

-the policy was for, an insurance against
loss on goods, "as well the property of
the assured, as held by them in trust or
on commission." The plaintiff's right
to recover was not disputed so far as the
amount of his advances was concerned,
and the question was plainly presented,
whether the advances were the proper
guide to the measure of damages, or
whether the plaintiff could recover for
the full value of the goods, or in other
words, what was&the insurable interest of
theplaintiff. The court held that a commission merchant, having goods in his
possession for sale, has an interest in
them which entitles him to insure them
in his own name to their full value.
It is to be noticed, however, that the
question as to whether the interest was
within the terms of the contract did not
arise, as the policy was expressly upon
goods held in trust or on commission, as
well as on those held in the plaintiff's
own right. In most of the cases the
question has been complicated by the
additional point, that goods held on
commission were not within the meaning of the policy, if insurable at all.
The doctrine of this case has been
generally followed, though not without
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hesitation and strenuous opposition.
In Millaudon vs. Atlantic Insurance Co.,
8 La. 557, a policy on "stock in trade"
was held to cover the whole value, although the insured only owned a half
interest as partner, and had a lien on
the rest for advances. And in Duncan
et al. vs. Sun Mutual Insurance Co., 12
La. An. 486, it was said that if it appears that the intention was to insure
for the benefit of any one in interest,
though not named, the interest is not to
be defeated by want of technical or even
customary phrases; but, otherwise, if
the most natural construction of the
policy is, that the insured sought to
protect only his own interest-citing
with approval De Forest vs. Fulton Insurance Co.
De Forest vs. Fulton Insurance Co.
has also been cited and approved in
other cases, both directly and incidentally (Van Natta vs. Mutual Security Insurance Co., 2 Sandf. 490; Stilwell vs.
Staples, 5 E. P. -Smith 401, and others,
infra), so that it may be considered not
only to have first announced, but also
firmly established the doctrine of the
right of a consignee, &c., to insure in
his own name, to the full value of the
goods; and Mr. Angell, in his treatise
on insurance, adopting the language of
PmRTLE, Ch., in Jackson vs. Rtna Insurance Co., 2 Am. Law Reg., Old Series
874, says: "The mode of making insurance in the case of De Forest vs. Fulton Fire Insurance Co., has never been
doubted in this country since the elaborate judgment in that case." (Sect. 75 a.)
II. The question presented by the
principal case, however, is not so much
the extent of insurable interest in a
commission merchant which may be
regarded as settled, as the effect of the
common clause in the policy requiring
goods held on commission to be insured
as such, where there is knowledge on

the part of the insurer that the goods
are so held, or other evidence to prove
either a waiver or a substantial compliance with this condition.
It is said by Mr. Phillips (Insurance,
ch. 1, 10), that "*thesubject-matter of
marine insurance and other mercantile
contracts, makes it necessary to go out
of the written instrument in order tc
interpret it, more frequently than in
most other contracts," and some strong
cases are given by him of words allowed
to be explained by evidence dehors the
writing; but they are all on the ground
of usage to explain latent ambiguity-a
recognised exception to the general rule
of interpreting contracts. And, again,
there are many cases in which equity
has interfered to reform a contract
which appears clearly to be different
from that which the parties to it intended.
Cases are not wanting, therefore, in
which clauses in policies of insurance,
and not unfrequently the very clause in
the principal case, concerning commission goods, have been construed with
great liberality, allowed to be explained
or varied by parol evidence, or altogether reformed by the equitable powers
of the court. Thus, in Franklin Fire
Insurance Co. vs. Hewitt et al., 3 B.
Monroe 231, the appellees had 'applied
for insurance on "their stock of merchandise generally contained," &c., in
a building used by them "as a commission house." An agent of the insurance
company took the application, and knew
of the character of the stock, business,
&c., but the company had sent a policy
with the clause requiring goods on commission to be expressly insured as such
It was held that the appellees had an
insurable interest, and that the policy
could be decreed by a Court of Equity
to include commission goods. And in
Jackson vs. .- tna Insurance Cr 1 2 Am
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Law Reg. 0. S. 374, in the Court of
Chancery of Louisville, the expression
"stock of a pork house," was held to be
equivalent to mention of the fact, that
some of the goods were not the plaintiff's, but were held on commission;
PITLE, Ch., citing Franklin Insurance

Co. vs. Hewitt, to show that a literal
compliance with the condition was not
necessary. And in the same case on
appeal (16 B. Monroe 242), though the
decree was somewhat varied, substantially the same ground was taken, the
court going the full length of the doctrine in De Forest vs. Fulton Insurance
Co.
In Howard Insurance Co. vs. Bruner,
11 Harris (23 Penna. State) 50, the
policy contained a clause that it was
"made and accepted in reference to the
conditions thereto annexed, which are
to be used and resorted to in order to
explain the rights and obligations of the
parties," &c., and among these conditions was one that, "when a policy is
made and issued upon a survey and description of certain property, such survey and description shall be taken to be
part and portion of such policy, and
warranty on the part of the assured."
In the written description on which the
policy was issued there were important
errors and omissions, but the plaintiffs
were allowed to give evidence that their
verbal description to 'the agent of defendants was correct, and that the
written description was made out by the
agent who knew from a survey all about
the property, and omitted part of the
description, considering it immaterial.
In Peoria Insurance Co. vs. Hall, ante p.
417, where a policy was conditioned, that
if gunpowder was kept without written
permission in the policy, the policy should
thereby become void, the Supreme Court
of Michigan held, that if the agent at
the time of taking the insurance knew
that powder was kept in the store, the

issuing of the policy was a waiver of the
condition, and it was not necessary that
the permission should be given in the
policy. In Protection Insurance Co. vs.
Wilson, 6 Ohio St. 553, insurance was
made on a common blank of a river
policy, against "perils of seas, rivers,
fire, jettison," &c., and the court allowed
parol evidence to show that this was
meant to include canal navigation, as
the company's agent knew that this
insurance was on a canal voyage.
On the other hand, in Beacon Fire
Insurance Co. Pa. Gibb et al., 9 Jurist
N. S.185 (a. c. 1 Moore P. C. C., N. S.
73), the insurance was on a steamboat,
but the policy was a printed form used
for houses, and contained a clause, that
"if more than twenty pounds of gunpowder should be on the premises at the
time when any loss happened, such loss
should not be made good." The vessel
had one hundred pounds of powder on
board at the time of her burping, but it
was admitted that the powder was not
in any way the cause of the loss. The
plaintiff contended that as the boat
was a trading boat, andit was the usage
of such boats to carry powder, and both
facts beihuq known to the com2pany when
making the insurance, the clause did not
apply, and the jury in finding the fact
of the powder being on board, added,
"which the owners of the said steamer
were not precluded by their policy from
ca rving.
The court however struck
out this last sentei ce from the verdict
as surplusage, and determined that the
construction was for the court, and
parol evidence was not admissible. On
appeal it was held by the Privy Council,
Lord CHELMSFORD delivering the opin-

ion, that the word "premises" applied
to the steamboat, and it appeared to be
conceded without question, that the ex.clusion of parol evidence was correct.
Again, in Mellen et al. vs. National
Insurance Co., 1 Hall 452, it was held
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that the charterer of a vessel cannot therefore show that there is no general
insure the amount of his charter-money principle of construction of policies of
under the general name of freight. The insurance different from that governing
policy is evidence of the contract, and other contracts. The court, therefore,
parol proof cannot be admitted to show in the principal case, in refusing to look
that the plaintiff under the name of beyond the writing, merely applied the
freight intended to insure the profits on general rule, though perhaps somewhat
more stringently than was done in some
his charter-party.
These may be considered the principal of the cases we have discussed, which
American cases, in which the apparent appear to have been decided on a liberal
meaning of the language of policies has reading of the principle announced by
75 a,)
been allowed to be varied by liberal Mr. Angell (Insurance, ch. 4,
construction, or by the introduction of from Jackson vs. . tna Insurance Co.,
parol evidence, and though some of them that it is sufficient if the clause requirdo not announce very clearly the gen- ing goods held on commission to be
eral rule on which they stand, yet they insured as such, "is substantially comJ. T. M.
may all be brought within the usual plied with."
exceptions of ambiguity or mistake, and

Supreme- Court of New Jer8ey.
DAVID TELFER, ADMINISTRATOR, V8. THE NORTHERN RAILROAD
COMPANY."
Where a party sues for damages caused by negligence of another, he must show
that he was not himself guilty of such negligence, or want of reasonable care
as contributed to the injury done.
Where a person in crossing a railroad track is injured by collision with the train,
the fault prima fade is his own, and he must show affirmatively that it is not,
before he is entitled to recover damages for the injury.
In an action by surviving relatives for death caused by negligence, the amount of
damages is to be measured by the pecuniary los merely, and in estimating that,
,the chances of health and life are to be considered as well as the value of
services.
The reciprocal duties of railroad companies and persons crossing the track dis.
cussed.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
VAN DYKE, J.-These two suits were tried togetner, and were
brought by the father to recover compensation in money for the
loss of his sons, who were killed by coming in collision with a
locomotive and train of cars. It is difficult to look at these suits
in the light of mere actions for damages, without being influenced
I We are indebted for this case to the courtesy of A. 0. Zabriskie, Esq
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in some measure by considerations such as we labor, almost in
vain, to turn aside from. The sad fate of the two lads, and the
grievous affliction which so suddenly fell upon a parent's heart,
are well calculated to awaken the kind sympathy of every human
bosom. Sympathy and condolence we may indeed extend to the
plaintiff, but unfortunately for him, we cannot permit these to
influence us in the sterner duties which we have to perform in the
cases. The only question which we can examine into is, whether
he has shown himself entitled to sustain the verdicts which he has
obtained. The jurors undoubtedly discharged their duty honestly
and conscientiously in these cases, but it is none the less the duty
of the court to set those verdicts aside if they be found contrary
to the law and the testimony. The charge is, that this occurrence
took place through the carelessness, negligence, and improper
conduct of the defendants. It seems to be very well settled that
if it did not take place in some such way, there can be no recovery, but it is equally well settled that although there may be
carelessness and negligence on the part of the party doing the
injury, yet if there was an equal amount of carelessnes% negligence, and improper conduct on the side of the party injured, he
cannot recover for such injuri~s. And this is the answer which
the defendants make to the plaintiff's charge, that the carelessness and negligence was not on their side, but on the side of the
parties injured, and that for this reason the verdicts are contrary
to the law and the evidence..
It is not an easy matter to determine always what constitutes
legal negligence and carelessness on the part of those who conduct railway trains, for we cannot very well compare them with
any other mode of land conveyance. . Railroads, and railroad
trains and railroad travel are specially authorized by law. The
legislature are supposed to know that these trains move 'with
immense weight, and power, and speed, and they authorize them
to do so, neither limiting nor restraining them to any extent in
these respects. It is also well known that at the rate of speed at
which they go, they are far less governable, so far as stopping is
concerned, than in any other mode of land travel, and far more
dangerous in cases of collision. This the legislature is supposed
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to know and understand, and yet they seem to authorize them so
to move. 'They are required, it is true, to ring their bells and
blow their whistles, and keep up sign-boards, but they are not
required in any case to lessen their speed when crossing any other
road, or to station signal-men there, except where municipal corporations occasionally impose upon them those duties. 'Nor would
the company be responsible for damages arising from collision,
when there was no whistle blown or bell rung, or sign-board
up, if the absence of these things in no way contributed to the
accident. It is difficult therefore to determine that a company is
guilty of negligence or carelessness, or improper conduct, while
it is only doing those things which the legislature has by formal
enactments or by necessary implication expressly authorized. For
instance, many of our railroads which frequently cross our common highways at very acute angles, and often running parallel
with them and close to them for long distances, thus frightening
the horses, and terrifying and endangering all persois travelling
on such highways, would doubtless be considered public nuisances,
and be indicted as such if carried on by private individuals n 6 t
authorized by law; yet when the legislature, which is supposed to
take all these things into consideration, expressly authorize them
so to do, they cannot be considered as nuisances. This was' so
held in 4 Barn. & Ald. 30; Roscoe's Or. Ev. 794.
It is very easy to see how all other persons who attempt to go.
upon or across a railroad track, are placed under the necessity
of using much greater care and caution than when going on or
abross any ordinary road, for all other persons and conveyances
are usually under immediate control, and may be stopped instantly if any damage threatens; but railroad trains are notoriously otherwise, and hence greater. care and caution are
necessary to avoid them. All other conveyances can turn to the
right or left, or in any other direction, to avoid accidents, but
railroad trains can do neither. They have a single fixed track
in which they must move, and can go nowhere else. All persons
and things are perfectly safe from collisions, except on this narrow track, and cannot be harmed unless they go upon that track.
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Consequently every person is under the strongest possible obligation not to venture upon that track when the cars are about to
pass. If he do so and get hurt, it can scarcely be otherwise than.
that the risk and the fault are his own. Nor does it make any difference how strongly the party may believe or suppose that he can
cross with safety. If he get hurt, the miscalculation was his own,
and the consequences must rest upon him. Nor does it at all
change the case that the party did not think of the cars. He
was bound to think of them if he knew the road was there. Nor
is it any excuse that he was in a covered wagon and-did not see,
or did not see fit to look, for a person cannot close his eyes or
cover himself up in the midst of danger, and then plead that he
could not see. Neither can it be successfully urged that the
persons injured were at too young an age to exercise the prudence
and discretion of an adult, for this is the very reason, if so, why
they should not have been exposed to such a peril. It was carelessness or recklessness to do so.
It is not a triffing matter to stop a train of cars where it would
not otherwise stop, when it is running on time, and is required to
pass another train at a given point, and where the failure to do
so might produce serious consequences. I do not think a conductor is bound to stop his train because he sees an individual
standing on the track a quarter of. a mile ahead of him, because
he has every reason to suppose that he will leave the track before
the cars reach him; nor do I think he is bound to stop his train
because he sees a vehicle slowly approaching the road, or quietly
standing a few yards from it, with the horse's head towards it, for
he has every reason to suppose that they will not attempt to cross
until the train be past, and if they suddenly attempt to do so
when too late to stop the train, and get injured in the effort, the
fault is not that of the company nor its agents, unless their conduct be so grossly careless as that the exercise of proper and
reasonable caution and prudence on the part of the party injured,
could not have protected him from the injury.
Is it true then that these verdicts are contrary to the law and
the evidence or either of them ? If they are, they should be set
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aside. The law on the subject seems to be so well settled by
numerous decisions, to be found scattered through the law books,
and is so unmistakable, that I shall not occupy time in referring
to it. It may be fairly and safely assumed that where the negligence or carelessness or improper conduct of the company or its
agents is clear, or where the exercise of a reasonable amount of
care and prudence on their part would have prevented the collision, and they did not exercise it, they will be liable, provided
the party injured was not himself guilty of the same want of reasonable care and prudence; for if he too by the exercise of a
reasonable amount of care and prudence might have avoided the
accident, and did not exercise them, he cannot recover, even
though the company were culpably negligent. He cannot visit
the consequences of his own indiscretion, folly, or want of judgment upon the adverse party. He must bear them himself.
I cannot say that the plaintiff did not offer evidence enough to
warrant th e cases in going to the jury, yet I am forced to say I
think it was very slender, unless indeed the mere fact that the
boys were killed by the collision, is of itself sufficient to make out
the case in the first instance-a proposition which I think we
cannot properly admit. Of the seventeen witnesses whom he
offered, but one only seems to have seen the occurrence -at all,
and she saw it through the window of her dwelling-house, at a
distance of some eight hundred feet, and when looking directly
on the rear of the wagon, which was closed behind. She did not
hear either bell or -whistle before the collision; she first saw the
boys by the sign-post some ninety feet from the track; she did
not then see the cars but heard them. Several of the witnesses
were in the public-house near by, with closed doors and windows.
who did not see the occurrence until it was past, and most of
whom say they did not hear the whistle till after the collision, a
fact which they could not very well know, as they did not see
precisely where it did take place. Another of the plaintiff's -witnesses says he stood in the shed, and saw-the cars for a considerable distance till within thirty or forty feet of the crossing, but
the blowing of the whistle and the noise of the cars frightened his
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horses, and he did not see the accident. A number of witnesses
were also examined to show that the crossing was a dangerous
one. It certainly was somewhat dangerous, and so is every other
crossing, unless some care and caution are used by persons
attempting to pass over; but according to the map or diagram
produced by the plaintiff, the crossing was not remarkably dangerous. But no witness on the part of the plaintiff says anything
which goes to show whether the boys acted- prudently or impruo
dently-whether the fault was wholly their own, or whether it
was not.
The testimony on the part of the defence is much more definite
and positive. Six- witnesses say they saw the occurrence, five of
them were on the train, though not all in the defendants' employ.
They all concur in saying that the whistle was blown some half
mile from the station, the brakes were put on to check the speed
until it could be ascertained whether there were any passengers
to get on or get off at the station. When the signal i'as given
that there were no passengers, the whistle was again blown to
take off the brakes. In an instant it was again blown violently
to put them on again, indicating danger, and continued to blow
violently until after the accident. The brakeman says that the
brakes were instantly applied. The engineer says the engine was
instantly reversed, and that the bell was rung for a considerable
distance. These five witnesses concur in saying that when the
signal was blown to take off the brakes, and the cars some two
hundred and fifty or three hundred yards from the crossing, the
horse, wagon, and boys were quietly standing back from the
track a distance which measures thirty-two feet; that one of the
boys was then looking out of the front of the wagon at the train,
but at the moment of blowing off the brakes, the horse, by a
stroke from the lines or a whip, or something else, was started
across the track, and at such speed that he was on a gallop
when the wagon was struck. A sixth witness, who was not on the
train, but was close by, confirms the testimony of the other five,
so far as the conduct of the boys is concerned. He says that he
saw the cars, and told the boys that they were coming; that the
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older boy answered that he did not care. He says that they
stopped, however, a short distance from the track. He saw the
boy strike the horse with the lines, and he started across and the
cars caught him.
All this evidence touching the conduct of the defendants, as
well as that of the boys, is wholly uncontradicted except by the
witness who saw the occurrence from her window at a distance of
eight hundred feet; she says the wagon did not stop at all, but as
she was some distance off, and was looking directly at the rear of
the wagon, and through the glass of her window, she could -not
very well tell with certainty, and may be mistaken as to that fact,
but the ot*hers all saw the occurrence from points which did not
admit of mistakes in that particular.
Three of the witnesses also say that they heard one of the boys
say, after he was hurt, that he saw the cars coming, but thought
he could get across. The speed of the cars is estimated by some
at from eighteen to twenty miles per hour, and by others at from
thirteen to fifteen.
Does this evidence then, taken all together, show any negligence
or improper conduct on the part of the defendant or their agents ?
If it does, I am wholly unable to perceive it. I do not see what
they could have done that would have prevented the accident that
they did not do. If it be true, and it is abundantly proved, that
the boys had stopped their wagon and were looking at the cars as
they approached, the conductor was not bound to stop the train
to see what they intended to do next, for he had every reason to
suppose that having once stopped they would remain in that condition until the train should have passed. The evidence of persons that they did not hear the bell or the whistle when they
were not in a good condition to hear them, or if they heard the
whistle at all that it was not blown until after the collision, when
they did not see the collision at all, cannot have very great weight
against the evidence of those who did see and hear, and say it was
positively and directly otherwise.
Does the evidence on the other hand show that the conduct'of
the boys was cautious and prudent such as the occasion called for ?
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On the contrary it seems difficnlt to imagine a case where the exer-ise of these duties could have been more deplorably absent.
Their action was rash and indiscreet in the extreme. The locomotive must have been within but a few yards of them when they
attempted to cross. They had but thirty-two feet to go, and
with their horse on a gallop, they had not yet got over when the3
were struck, showing that the traiin was very close to them when
they started.
Unpleasant as the idea is, there seems no way of resisting the
conclusion that the fault as well as the misfortune was wholly and
entirely their own. It appears too by the evidence of their
sister, that these boys had been in the habit, one or the other of
them-, of going this way every day for the last two or three years
and returning about the same time; that the horse was the one
they usually drove, and that he was gentle; and so said others: so
that nothing can be urged in their favor on the score of their
being ignorant of the peril into which they went.
These verdicts therefore are contrary to the law- of the land
which governs, such cases, and that law should be fully and
strongly declared and maintained, for the public are as much concerned in the caution and prudence of those who cross railways
as they are in the caution and prudence of those who conduct the
trains. If this occurrence, happening just as it did;,.had left the
boys unharmed, but had thrown the train from the track, killing
half-a-dozen passengers and maiming four times that number, we
should have se~n more clearly the force of this remark. The
necessity for caution, therefore, is tenfold greater when crossing
a railroad track than in crossing any other road, and the culpability of those neglecting to exercise that caution is ten times as
great as in ordinary cases. In crossing ordinary roads, caution
and care are chiefly demanded to avoid running against or over
anybody else, in crossing railroads it is exacted to avoid being
run over yourself. In the former case the blame attaches primd
facie to the party doing the injury, in the latter it attaches in the
first instance to the party obstructing the track. Common prudence and common caution require every person approaching a
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railroad crossing, if he knows of it, to pause and see if he can
cross with safety, and if there be any danger at all he is bound to
wait until it is past, and although there may be much practice to
the contrary, still if he do not do this he does not exercise either
common prudence or common caution.
The evidence in these cases affirmatively and clearly proves the
most culpable rashness and improper conduct on the part of the
boys, and therefore the verdicts are contrary to the law which we
are bound to apply to them, and for this reason they should be set
aside.
The 'verdicts, too, are clearly against the evidence in the cases,
not merely against the weight of evidence but contrary to the
whole evidence, and they should be set aside for this reason also;
and to this c6nclusion J1 should have been brought as a matter of
necessity even if the defendents had offered no evidence at all, for
the reason that, with their evidence or without their evidence,
there is nothing in the whole of it which shows affirmatively that
the boys exercised any care, prudence, or caution, whatever to
avoid the occurrence, or that the fault was not clearly and positively their own. These things, or some of them, the plaintiff was
bound to show before he could be entitled to the verdicts.
It is insisted *also that the damages in these cases are excessive.
In the case of David they are assessed at $986, and in the case of
William at $1056. In the view which I have taken of the cases it
is not necessary to examine this part of them, but the qiestion
presented is one of importance, and deserves the consideration of
the court either now or at some other time. The jury seem to
have been left pretty much to their own conclusions in the matter,
as there was but little, if any, evidence to throw light on the subject, beyond the fact of the relationship between the father and
his children, and it may be doubted if they could have reached
the conclusions which they did if they.had been governed by correct legal principles.
The action is the creation of the statute, and it is needless to
say that it must conform strictly to it. It is liable to great
abuse, and the court should see that every verdict which is renVOL. XII.-43
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dered contrary to it should be set aside. It is simply an action
to recover, in dollars and cents, a compensation for the loss an4
damages which have actually been sustained. As the father of
his children, the plaintiff was entitled to their services until they
should arrive at the age of twenty-one years, and what those
services might reasonably have been expected to be worth, he was
entitled to recover, and nothing more, unless it be expensea
growing out of the injury, subject to the burthens and incumbrances which that relationship imposed upon him. Nothing can
be allowed for the mental anguish which, as a parent, he is sup.
posed to have suffered. Nothing for the satisfaction and comfort
of having his sons-nothing for the loss of their society and associations.
The damages in the case of William are fixed at $1056. He
was over thirteen years of age, and had something over seven
years to serve his father. This is an allowance then of about
$150 per year on an average. This is about what the services of
a full-grown man would be worth, in th6 business in which the
plaintiff was engaged, when boarded, provided he should work
faithfully the whole of that time.
If this is the principle upon which the jury proceeded, they
were unquestionably wrong, for as the plaintiff was bound not only
to feed, but to properly clothe and educate his son,. and to take
care of him if sick, pay his physician's bills, &c., it may well be
doubted whether his services would have been worth any more
than his board, clothing, education, and other incidentals previous to his arriving at the age of eighteen years. At all events,
these things should have been taken into consideration by the
jury, and proper deductions made on account of them, as well as
for the days of idleness, of absence, and of pleasure. incident to
such relationship, and likely to intervene. The jury seem, too, to
have gone on the supposition that William would remain in sound
health, and serve faithfully during every day of the time, whereas
they were bound to consider the probability that through accidents, sickness, and the like, he might be unable, possibly for a
considerable portion of the time, to perform service at all, when
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he would be an expense rather than an advantage. Then too
they seem to have taken it for granted, that he was certainly
going to live through the whole period, and his life, during the
whole of that time, the defendants are made to insure, whereas it
was possible he might die the next day, when his services of
course would have ceased. We may be quite willing to bind ourselves to pay a man $1050 for seven years' service, if we can
certainly have that service secured to us, when we would not be
willing to pay half that sum if we are to take all the risk of his
sickness, accidents, and death in the mean time. These things
too should have been. taken into consideration and allowed for,
and if they had been, all of them, it seems difficult to-see how the
jury could properly have calculated the damages at $1056. The
same principles and rules apply of course to the case of David,
and if this were the only reason on which we are asked to set the
verdicts aside, I should feel constrained to yield to it, believing
'as I do, that the jury must have proceeded upon erroneous principles in this respect in reaching their conclusions.

District Court of the United State-District of Atassachusett.
THE IRON-CLAD RAM ATLANTA.'
flhe statutes of the United States provide for two classes of ships which shall share
the proceeds of a prize:
1. Those making the capture.
2. Those within signal distance of the vessel making the capture.
The statutes also provide different rules of distribution of the proceeds where the
prize was of equal or superior and where it was of inferior force to the vessel or
vessels making the capture.
In estimating the relative force of the prize for the purpose of such distribution,
only the first class of captors are to be considered.
The fects of the capture of the Atlanta.

Mr. Dana (U. S. Attorney) appeared. for the United States,
1 We have received this opinion through the courtesy of Mr. Dana, United States

District Attorney. The case is one of a somewhat novel aharacter, and cannot
fail to be of interest to our readers.
1. F. R.
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and Mr. Hodge of Washington, agent for the captors, submitted a
written argument. Mr. C. P. Curti8, Jr., afterwards appeared
for the captors.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SPRAGUE, J.-This vessel, an iron-clad war steamer, taken from
the rebels in battle, has been condemned as lawful prize, and the
question now is on the distribution. The main and difficult question is whether the entire value is to go to the captors, or half to
them and half to the government. The Act of 1862, ch. 204, sec.
2, prescribes the rule thus :-If the prize was of equal or superior
force to "the vessel or vessels making the capture," it goes wholly
to the captors; if of inferior force, it is divided equally between.
the United States and the " officers and men making the capture."
Another section provides for the distribution of the whole or half
adjudged to the captors in these words :-" When one or more
vessels of the Navy shall be within signal distance of another
making a prize, all shall share in the prize." In determining
whether the captors shall have half or all, the court must first
decide what vessel or vessels "made the capture" or "made the
prize," and then compare the capturing force with the force of
the prize. Then, having by this process adjudged the whole or
the half to the vessels making the prize or capture, the court is to
determine whether any and what vessels of the Navy-were within
signal distance of the vessel or vessels that made the prize, and let
them in to participation.
What vessel or vessels, in this case, " made the capture ?" The
officers of the Atlanta, now prisoners of war at Fort Warren in
this harbor, have refused to testify, so that I have not the benefit
of their statements. But still, the evidence in the cause presents
a clear account of this most interesting conflict,-perhaps in its
bearings on naval science, the most significant battle in modern
times, except that of the Monitor and Merrimac.
The Atlanta, "originally a British steamer, powerful and fast,
called the Fingal, had, early in the war, run the blockade of
Savannah, and been converted by the rebels into an iron-clad war
steamer, at a vast expense. She had a long low deck, with a case.
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mate or covered iron-plated house in the centre, with sloping sides
and ends, in which was her battery. She had also a powerful
ram, and, attached to her bow and carried under water, a torpedo
charged with about fifty pounds of powder. Two steam-vessels of
our navy, of the type so novel and yet already so universally
known as monitors, were guarding the Wassau Sound, to prevent
the egress of the Atlanta. These were the Weehawken, commanded by Captain John Rodgers, and the Nahant, commanded
by Captain John Downes. Captain Rodgers was the senior and
commanding officer. Each monitor had one revolving turret with
two smooth-bore Dahlgren guns, one of fifteen inch and the other
of eleven inch calibre. The rebels knew that these monitors were
there, and knew their size and force, and the Atlanta, when fully
ready, was sent down the Sound for the purpose of capturing or
destroying them. It would seem, too, that they had little doubt
of their success. The Atlanta was accompanied by several steamers having passengers on board, to be spectators of the conflict.
Two of these steamers were armed, and belonged to the rebel
navy, but, being wooden vessels, they kept at a safe distance and
took no part in the action. On our' side, also, there was the
wooden gunboat Cimmerone, which was directed by Captain
Rodgers to keep out of the action unless signalled specially.
It was at early dawn of the 17th of June, 1863, a little after four
o'clock, that the Atlanta was descried coming down the Sound.
The monitors at once began to prepare for action. The Weehawken lay higher up than the lahant. She slipped hei cable. • Th6
Nahant weighed her anchor, Captain Downes thinking he might
need it in the action, in case of injury to his motive power, and
that he could prepare for action as well while weighing. To give
themselves time to get fully ready, Captain Rodgers steamed
slowly down the Sound, directing Captain Downes to follow in hjs
wake, the Weehawken having the pilot. Captain Downes followed
in the wake of the Weehawken as soon as he got his anchor. This
left him for a time nearer to the advancing enemy than the Weehawken. When fully ready, the Weehawken turned toward the
enemy. Just as she turned, the Atlanta opened her fire on the
Nahant. Her shot did not take effect.
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The Weehawken rounded and steamed towards the Atlanta, the
Nahant following in her wake. It was then seen that the Atlanta
was stationary and lying partly across the channel. When within
between three hundred and four hundred yards, the Weehawken
slowed and fired her fifteen inch gun. Drifting with the tide, and
under slow way, when within about two hundred yards, she fired
both her guns, as nearly together as possible. Captain Downes
acted on a different plan. He thought his fire would be most
effectual close aboard, and made directly for the Atlanta at full
speed, reserving his fire until he should be at close quarters.
Captain Downes was never from the first more than a thousand
yards separated from the Weehawken, and at this second discharge
was about the same distance from the Atlanta that the Weehawken was. Immediately after the second discharge from the Weehawken, the Atlanta hauled down her colors and ran up a small
white flag, in token of surrender. This was mistaken by the Weehawken in the smoke for a white and blue flag, which was the
rebels' battle flag, and the Weehawken fired both her guns agaifi.
By this time the Nahant was very near the Atlanta and 'ready to
fire, but had discovered that she had surrendered.
Captain Downes ranged alongside, in natural disappointment,
and asked why she surrendered so soon. The monitors had
dropped their boats overboard to clear for action. The Nahant's
boats were nearest, and she steamed off for them and picked one
of them up, and her executive officer boarded the Atlanta and took
possession of her. In the mean time, however, the commander of
the Atlanta had lowered his own boat and went on board the Weehawken, and had surrendered his sword to Captain Rodgers before
the Atlanta was boarded by the Nahant.
After the surrender, we learned the effect of our shot partly
from observation and partly by statements of the rebel officers.
The first shot from the Weehawken, a fifteen inch ball, cored, as
it is termed, that is, with a hollow sphere in the centre, in this
case of six inches, weighing four hundred pounds and fired with
thirty-five pounds of powder, at a distance of between three and
four hundred yards, struck the Atlanta upon the side of her case-
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mate, knocking a hole in it, but without going through, and scattering over the enclosed decks great quantities of wood and iron
splinters, some of dangerous size, wounding several men, and prostrating on deck, insensible, many others. The rebel officers told
our officers that as many as forty persons were knocked down and
either wounded or stunned for the moment by the effects of this
shot, and that it demoralized the entire crew. The next discharge,
at about two hundred yards' distance, was from both guns, a fifteeninch cored shot, and an eleven-inch solid shot, the latter weighing
one hundred and sixty-eight pounds. One of these, it is thought
the fifteen inch, struck the top of the pilot-house, crushing and
driving down the bars on the top and sides, wounding both pilots
and one helmsman, and stunning the other helmsman as well as
the wounded men. These men fell on the floor of the pilot-house,
and the rebel officers said prevented any one from getting up into
it. The other shot struck the edge of the overhung knuckle,
where the casemate fits to the deck, doing little damage. In the
*ords of Oaptain Rodgers, the first shot took away the desire to
fight, and the second the ability to get away. One of the two
guns fired at the last discharge struck a port stopper, breaking it
in two, and driving its fragments through the port. No statement
is made as to the -effect of the fifth shot fired.
It is admitted by the officers of both monitors that the gunboat
Cimmerone was all the while within signal distance and acting
under the orders of the senior officer; and consequently entitled to
participate in the distribution, as being "within signal distance
of the vessel or vessels making the prize." The only question as
to her is whether she is to be counted in, as part of the capturing
force ; that is, whether she is to be deemed one of the vessels
"making the capture," within the meaning of the statute, when
we are comparing the force of the captors with that of the prize,
for the purpose of determining whether the proceeds belong wholly
to the captors, or are to be divided between them and the government. In the recent case of The Cherokee (ante, p. 289), I had
occasion to examine the question of joint capture, and I refer to
The
the results then reached, so far as they bear upon this case

THE IRON-CLAD RAM ATLANTA.

English statutes- and Orders-in-Council do not make the distine
tion. in distribution, based on superiority or inferiority of force.
The entire- prize is given in all cases to the captors. Consequently, we cannot find in British decisions any direct aid in solving the present question. Neither have their statutes or Ordersin-Council, until the Russian war, made any distinction between
actual captors and vessels in sight of the actual captors; but have
simply given the entire prize to " the takers." The -courts, in
applying the rules, have made liberal constructions of the word
"takers," on reasons of policy and equity, and have included in
the term "takers," by construction, vessels within sight under
such circumstances that they may be held to have afforded en.
couragement to the captors and intimidation to the enemy. This
has naturally led the courts to speak of some vessels as actual
captors, and others as constructive captors. Still, as relative force
was immaterial, and a vessel claiming to be an actual captor
would usually be at least a constructive captor, and the share of
\ach would be the same, we do not find anywhere in the British
decisions a.definition or test of the difference between actual and
constructive captors which is of practical value in the application
of our own statute.
Our statutes, as I held in The Cherokee, recognised two classes,
vessels making the capture, and vessels which do not make the
capture, but are within signal distance of those that do. From
this -the inference is, that the mere fact of being within signal
distance, able and ready to give aid if required, does not bring a
vessel into the first class. If it did, we should confound the distinction made by the statute, and treat as actual captors all who
were within signal distance of actual .captors. Another result
would follow, that all vessels within signal distance of this second
class of vessels would share in the distribution, though not within
signal distance of the first class, because .they would be within
signal distance of some of the vessels which we should have held
to be vessels making the capture.
I have no difficulty, therefore, in-deoiding that I must exclude
the Cimmerone, in determining the relative force of the captors
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and the prize. In like manner I exclude the gunboats of the
rebels which were within signal distance of the Atlanta, but kept
aloof.
It now becomes necessary to compare the force of the Atlanta
with that of our monitors.
Beside the depositions, complete drawings of the Atlanta have
been annexed to Captain Rodgers's evidence, and a report from
the Bureau of Construction. The Atlanta's dimensions were as
follows: Length, 191 feet 2 inches. Extreme beam, 40 feet 6
inches. Depth of hold to top of beam, 13 feet and J inch.
These dimensions make her measurement tonnage 927 6-10
tons, or if, .as the agent of the captors contends, we must include
the thickness of the deck, 1075 8-95 tons. She was plated with
two layers of iron, one horizontal and one vertical, each two
inches thick, making four inches of plating. At the knuckle,
where the casemate was fastened to the hull, her sides were six
feet in thickness, of solid wood. Her deck was two feet one inch
in thickness of plank, besides the iron covering. Her casemate
was a little over one hundred feet in length, fastened to the hull,
in about the 'middle of the length of the deck, and covering its
entire width, leaving an open deck of about forty-five feet at each
end. This casemate had sloping sides and ends, at an angle of
twenty-nine degrees from the horizontal, and three ports on each
side, with heavy port-stoppers. The sides of the casemate were
four inches of iron and thirty-six inches of solid wood. She
mounted four guns, Brooke's rifled ordnance, two seven-inch,
throwing balls of one hundred and fifty pounds, and two sixinch, throwing 'balls of one hundred pounds, the six-inch guns
working in broadsides, and the seven-inch guns, one at the forward and one at the after end of the casemate, working on pivots
either as broadside or bow and stern guns, so that three of. her
four guns could be used on either broadside. She had a powerful
ram of solid wood, strapped with iron bands, above water, and a
torpedo at the end of a jointed crane, capable of being raised in
the air or lowered under water, carried about twenty feet beyond
the bow, and charged with some fifty pounds of powder, expected
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to explode on concussion. Her crew were one hundred and fortythree, all told.
The two monitors were as nearly equal, indeed as nearly identical as it is easy to suppose war vessels to be. They were each
844 tons measurement, armed and arranged alike, with the usual
low deck of the monitors, but little above the water line, with
one revolving turret. Their guns were of the same calibre, one
of fifteen-inch and one of eleven-inch, smooth bore Dahlgrens,
the former throwing shots of 440 pounds solid, and 400 pounds
cored, and the latter 168 pounds solid. The Weehawken had
eighty-four men, and the Nahant eighty-five men.
In comparing the force of these novel engines of war, the old
rules of naval science are superseded. Not only are the vessels
extraordinary and experimental, but the ordnance scarcely less
so. The first shot from the Weehawken is said to have been the
first iron shot of'that size ever fired in naval warfare. I entertain
no serious doubt that the force of the two monitors combined was
superior to that of the Atlanta (I do not judge merely by the
result), I am aware that a different course on either or both sides
might have presented a different aspect. If the Atlanta had run
at the Monitors with her full force, instead of lying still to take
and give fire, and her torpedo had exploded under one of them
successfully, or if she had struck both or either of them with the
full force of her ram; or if a better aimed or more fortunate shot
had injured the turret or steering or motive power of either
monitor; or if the first two shots from the Weehawken bad been
less skilfully directed or less fortunate, or the Weehawken had
reserved her fire to the last, and thus the Atlanta been able to
use her battery steadily until at close' quarters ;-under any or
all these suppositions, the length of the contest, and the injuries
on each side, might have been very different if the final result had
been the same. I am to consider the means the vessels possessed,
and not the use they made of them. Still I am satisfied that for
offence and defence, the two monitors with their batteries, acting
together at the same time, and under one command, must be considered of superior force to the Atlanta. They were each of 844
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tons, and the Atlanta of about 1000 tons. They had one eightyfour and the other eighty-five men, and the Atlanta one hundred
and forty-three men. The effective power of large ordnance
against iron-clads has not yet been fully tested by experience, and
in the present state of our knowledge the actual effect of the shot
of the Weehawken must have much influence in forming oui
opinion. I am constrained to think that two fifteen-inch and two
eleven-inch smooth-bore Dahlgrens, mounted on two vessels, capable of taking separate positions, are superior for offence to two
seven-inch and two six-inch rifled Brooke's, in one vessel. And
in case of a fight on the decks, by boarding or otherwise, we had
the superiority in men. As to defence, the Atlanta presented a
larger surface than the monitors, and could be more easily hit;
and the result showed.that the walls of her sides and pilot-house,
however strong, were not in fact a protection against the shot of
the monitors at that range. We do not know by experiment how
well our hulls and turrets would have resisted her shot, but a construction which avoids shot is an element to be. calculated, as well
as one which.resists shot. Indeed neither the agent of the captors,
in his argument, nor the, two commanders, in their depositions,
appear to contend or to give an opinion that the Atlanta was
equal or superior'to the two monitors.
The agent for the captors contends that in comparing the forces,
the Weehawken alone is to be counted. It is said that the only
shot fired and the only damage done was by the Weehawken, and
that her shot compelled the surrender; that the Atlanta was put
bbyond the possibility of fighting or escaping, by the first two
shots, and actually surrendered by reason of them, before the
Nahant had in fact done anything. It is contended that it was
not necessary that the Nahant should have been present; that the
Atlanta did not surrender by reason of intimidation from- the
presence and approach of the Nahant, but by reason of her
own totally disabled condition. It is further argued that the
Nahant must be considered only a constructive captor; that she
was within signal distance, ready and eager, and doing her best
to aid in the battle, so situated as to afford encouragement to our
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side, and intimidation to the enemy, but that such is the definition
of a constructive captor, and that the facts go no further. It may
be said, too, that the policy of the statute is to stimulate vessels
to attack equal or superior vessels at once and alone; and that if
a vessel does so, and succeeds before others actually strike a blow,
the entire prize should go to the captors; and that, in such case, it
ought to be deemed immaterial how near the others may be, or on
what theory of battle they reserved their fire.
In a question solely between conduct of the highest merit and
the public treasury, the government would doubtless desire a construction liberal to the officers and men who perilled all in a
strange and unwonted conflict, and attained a success that has
attracted the attention of the world. But my duty is limited to
construing the statute. I cannot make a gratuity of the public
property, however meritorious the object.
I shall decide the present case on its exact and peculiar circum6tances. I lay down no rule for other cases, nor do I say what
variation from the facts of this case would have led to a different
application of the statute. I am led to the belief that the Nahant
must be considered so far a participator in the conflict of forces,
as to be included in the comparison. The Atlanta came down to
attack both the monitors, knowing they were together, under one
command and for one purpose. She calculated on their combined
force, and governed herself accordingly. It is impossible for me
to say now, whether the Atlanta would have taken the same
course if she had bad only the Weehawken to deal with. Each
monitor knew that the other was co-operating-not merely ready
to co-operate, but actually taking part in the attack, during all
the time within effective distance for firing, and part of the time
at nearly the same distance from the enemy with her consort, and
one as capable as the other of all acts of offence and defence.
This is not all. It was the Nahant that the Atlanta fired at.
*TheNahant drew off the fire of the enemy, and engaged its offensive force, so far' aiding her consort. It was known to those on
board the Atlanta that the Nahant, apparently uninjured by their
previous fire, was coming upon the Atlanta at full speed, reserv.
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ing her fire, though within easy range. This would have been
enough to settle a doubtful question of surrender, if a doubt
remained. One of the facts to be considered by the commander
of the Atlanta, in determining whether and when to surrender,
might well have been the demoralized state of his crew. How far
may the knowledge that a second monitor of the same, force with
that from which they had suffered so terribly was within equal
distance have contributed to this demoralization ? How far did
the co-operation of the two monitors affect the course taken by
the Atlanta in all respects, the training her guns on the Nahant,
her lying still to present her broadside? How far did this cooperation affect the course taken by each monitor ? If the Weehawken had not been there, or had not opened fire, would or
would not Captain Downes have reserved his fire as he did? If
the Weehawken had been alone, or with a vessel within signal
distance capable of aiding, but not just-where the Nahant was, and
doing just what she was doing, would or not her course have been
the same ? If the Nahant had not diverted the fire of the Atlanta,
what might have been its effect on the Weehawken ?, If Captain
Rodgers's shot had been unsuccessful, might or might not, in a
few minutes,-almost seconds, the close discharge of the Nahant
have been decisive?
The result to which I am brought is, that in comparing the
force of "the vessel or vessels making the capture" with that of
the prize, I must include the Nahant with the Weehawken.. I do
this, as the result of the special circumstances of this case, without attempting to. establish a test for determining who, under
other circumstances, should be deemed actual captors.
The result is, that half the net proceeds of the prize are to be
given to the captors, and half to the United States, and that the
vessels entitled to participate in the distribution are the Wee.
hawken. Nahant, and Cimmerone.

